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Abstract
Deepfakes, or artificially generated audiovisual renderings, can be used to defame
a public figure or influence public opinion. With the recent discovery of generative
adversarial networks, an attacker using a normal desktop computer fitted with an off-
the-shelf graphics processing unit can make renditions realistic enough to easily fool
a human observer. Detecting deepfakes is thus becoming vital for reporters, social
networks, and the general public. Preliminary research introduced simple, yet surpris-
ingly efficient digital forensic methods for visual deepfake detection. These methods
combined convolutional latent representations with bidirectional recurrent structures
and entropy-based cost functions. The latent representations for the video are carefully
chosen to extract semantically rich information from the recordings. By feeding these
into a recurrent framework, we were able to sequentially detect both spatial and tem-
poral signatures of deepfake renditions. The entropy-based cost functions work well in
isolation as well as in context with traditional cost functions.
However, re-enactment based forgery is getting harder to detect with newer generation
techniques ameliorating on temporal ironing and background stability. As these gen-
erative models involve the use of a learnable flow mapping network from the driving
video to the target face, we hypothesized that the inclusion of edge maps in addi-
tion to dense flow maps near the facial region provides the model with finer details to
make an informed classification. Methods were demonstrated on the FaceForensics++,
Celeb-DF, and DFDC-mini (custom-made) video datasets, achieving new benchmarks
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in all categories. We also perform extensive studies to evaluate on adversaries and
demonstrate generalization to new domains, consequently gaining further insight into
the effectiveness of the new architectures.
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1 Introduction
While misinformation being spread through interpersonal communication and mass media is
hardly new, we are at a pivotal point in history where advances in digital communication and
AI, in particular, threaten to magnify misinformation’s scale, persistence and consequence
[20, 57]. Historically, journalists have played a significant role vetting information before
publication and dissemination. Now, however, with deceptive information harder to verify,
journalists accidentally threaten to contribute to information anarchy, stoking unfounded
fears in the public. At best, false information may manipulate emotions and opinions. At
worst, it could lead to organized and destabilizing public actions united behind false ideas
or impressions.
Deepfakes are artificially generated audiovisual renderings of a person. These recordings,
which are typically done without consent, can be used to defame a public figure or influence
public opinion. Much like malicious computer viruses, deepfake generation [38, 21, 47, 79,
28, 29, 11, 58, 90, 68, 60, 78, 45, 82, 23, 56, 41, 89, 69, 88, 83, 82] and deepfake detection
[1, 70, 22, 55, 62, 14, 43, 54, 13, 4, 40, 18, 6, 42, 7, 16, 52, 85, 10, 2, 3, 87] techniques are
continually evolving. As time passes, deepfake generation methods are not only becoming
more realistic or believable, but they are learning to better circumvent detection methods.
In parallel, deepfake detection methods are learning to recognize subtle hints or fingerprints
inadvertently introduced by improved generation methods.
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Figure 1: An overview of the problem space. Audio and visual tracks are extracted and
processed through spoof and deepfake detection models.
Deepfake creation methods typically rely on face swapping [38, 47] or face synthesis [79]
combined with audio dubbing, voice conversion or voice synthesis [46]. Detection methods
have concentrated on structure [1, 70, 22, 55, 62, 14, 54] or soft biometrics [43, 13, 4] in
visual data, as well as spoof detection for audio [35, 80, 37]. Digital forensic methods can be
very good at detecting targeted forgeries, but they struggle at out-of-sample, or unforeseen
creation methods.
Inspired by the XceptionNet [12] architecture and convolutional recurrent neural network
methods [22, 71], we introduce simple, yet effective architectures for the detection of both
deepfake video and audio. As shown in Fig. 1, in agreement with current datasets and
challenges, we treat audio and video as separate problems. The audio and video streams
are referred to as spoof detection and deepfake detection, respectively. This research work
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focuses on the deepfake detection stream but not the audio network because there doesn’t
exist a dataset where both the audio and the video channels are manipulated.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Deepfake Generation
Deepfake creation is a relatively new field in digital forgery. Although the generation process
began with traditional vision and voice impersonation, most recent works involve generative
adversarial networks (GANs). We will first describe the traditional approaches, and then
the adversarial methods.
In general, there are two types of deepfake generation, face replacement and face re-enactment.
In face replacement, the face of a target person is overlaid on the face of a source. The over-
laid faces are post-processed to blend the edges such that they match the source’s facial
outline. This can be used, for example, to make Nicholas Cage (the source actor) appear
in a movie in place of the original (target) actor.1 Faceswaps [39] are a graphical approach,
where the facial landmarks (nose, eyes, eyebrows, lips, chin, and cheek areas) play a major
role in morphing the target’s face with the source’s, and the output is post-processed with
edge polishing and color correction.
Facial re-enactment, on the other hand, is used to make a target appear to act and speak
like the source. This is used, for example in the videos where former U.S. President Barack
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model both the source and target faces to identify facial landmarks and manipulate the
target’s landmarks to match the source’s facial movements. Face2Face [79] is a face re-
enactment method that translates the facial expressions of a source subject with a target
while maintaining the facial features of the target.
More recent Deepfake methods are based on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [21].
GANs consist of two competing neural networks: a generator G that generates fake samples
that mimic real samples from a target dataset, and a discriminator D that tries to tell fakes
apart from real samples. These two networks are trained simultaneously, such that over the
training period, both the generator and discriminator improve. Upon successful convergence,
the generator can then be used to create realistic-looking examples. To promote variation, G
is seeded with a noise vector, but this noise vector can be paired with a latent representation
of an object (word, image, sentence), to constrain the resulting image [61].
Zhu et al. [91] and Kim et al. [31] built on the GAN concept and replaced the noise vector with
input images. This modification enabled their cycle-consistent GANs to alter the domains of
the output images based on the input image domains. Similarly, in deepfake generation, it is
possible to retain the facial expressions of a source person while transferring identities to a
target person. Lu et al. [48] proposed an identity-guided conditional CycleGAN to translate
low-resolution face images to high-resolution face images. Kim et al. [30] accomplished a
similar transfer, with the difference being that they transfer expressions as well as 3D pose
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into a target image, creating a video in the process. Faceswap-GAN [47] created realistic
looking imagery using adversarial and perceptual losses. The addition of a perceptual loss
was shown to minimize unnatural artifacts such as awkward eyeball movements. Temporal
smoothing of the frame-to-frame face detection box and an attention mask made the created
videos appear more realistic. NeuralTextures [78] is a facial re-enactment forgery that relies
directly on facial landmarks. These fakes are generated using a patch-based adversarial loss
alongside a photometric reconstruction loss.
Wang et al. [83, 82] proposed flow-based video-to-video synthesis that required training on
multiple talking videos of the same person for face re-enactment forgery and revamped the
network to only use a single image of a person in generating a deepfake. Siarohin et al. [69]
introduced a learnable optical flow network approximating it to a first-order Taylor polyno-
mial. Their method enabled few-shot capability to generate a manipulated video of a person
using a single image. Li et al. [41] devised an adaptive-attention-based denormalization
generator for high-quality face replacement using a novel learning metric. In an interesting
twist, Suwajanakorn et al. [72] achieved photorealistic results by only requiring audio as an
input to generate forged videos. Using the weekly addresses of Barack Obama, the raw audio
features are first mapped to mouth shapes, then mouth textures, then 3D pose mapping,
and finally compositing of the head and torso from stock footage.
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2.2 Deepfake Detection
Since the threats posed by deepfake video manipulations became apparent in early 2018,
several works have looked into detecting them. A few of the detection techniques targeted
handcrafted features [43, 13, 50] like blinking inconsistencies, biological signals, and unreal-
istic details. Most of these manually crafted detection features exploit known weaknesses in
creation methods. Like a cat-and-mouse game, deepfake creation methods quickly adapted
to circumvent detection, and the cycle repeats. Recent detection methods [40, 18, 6, 42,
7, 16, 52, 85, 10] rely on machine learning on deepfake datasets to automatically discover
forgeries from real videos.
MesoNet [1] uses a shallow convolutional network to detect forgery at a mesoscopic (or inter-
mediate) level of detail, intentionally avoiding focusing too much on microscopic features that
could be lost due to video compression. They also introduced a variant of their model that
replaces regular convolution blocks with MesoInception blocks to get slight improvements.
The Capsule-Forensics method proposed by Nguyen et al. [55] uses capsule networks [25] for
the detection of replay attacks as well as computer-generated images and videos. They argue
that the chances of detecting high-quality forgeries would be increased with the agreement
between capsules through dynamic routing [65]. Cozzolino et al. [14] applied an autoencoder-
based architecture to show its usefulness for transfer learning. Nguyen et al. [54] extended
Cozzolino et al.’s network by replacing the standard decoder with a decoder that additionally
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generates a mask of the manipulated region through multi-task learning.
XceptionNet [12] is one of the more promising deep neural models for feature extraction
when trained either from scratch or with pre-trained ImageNet [15] weights. As such, we
choose XceptionNet as an embedding space instead of the networks used in prior works [22,
71]. The network architecture not only uses skip connections akin to ResNet [24] with an
Inception-like [74] convolutional arrangement, but it also has a modified version of depth-
wise separable convolutional layers for reducing the number of parameters with marginally
better performance.
While the previously mentioned methods targeted intra-frame inconsistencies, Güera and
Delp [22] introduced a spatio-temporal model with InceptionV3 [74] as the feature extraction
network to tackle deepfakes. The features from their time-distributed extraction network are
forwarded to a unidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network that ultimately
makes the classification decision. Sabir et al. [64] evaluated the same architecture with
different feature extractors [27, 24]. Their face-extraction process was adjusted by aligning
the faces from consecutive frames using facial landmarks to maintain temporal consistency.
While their performance on manipulated videos [22] from the HOHA dataset [84] was quite
good, performance on the larger and more complex FaceForensics++ [62] dataset was not
as effective.
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Agarwal et al. [4, 2, 3] took an alternative approach to detection by treating the problem
as one of anomalous behavior detection. They learn the typical behavior of the subject
from real videos by extracting facial landmarks and temporal actions and use them to train
novel networks for behavioral understanding. They also model correlation-based anomaly
detection between lip movements and phonemes/visemes. Although these methods cannot
be used on unforeseen faces, it is an effective option to preserve robustness against future
improvements in other aspects of deepfake generation. For example, they claim there is al-
ready sufficient data for most world leaders, although it would be a considerable undertaking
to train a detector for all government officials, corporate leaders, or persons of interest.
It is also established that GANs leave their impression on the samples they generate. Yu et
al. [87] discuss the potential of GAN fingerprinting analysis by developing a network that is
able to extract the model fingerprint from the samples. However, this technique can only be
used as a baseline to improvize on because their work can’t be generalized for a plethora of
deepfake generators.
Although most of the deepfake detection models are accurate on paper, they are unequivo-
cally prone to adversarial attacks. Some of the works [59, 53, 9, 63] analyze the pitfalls of
the state-of-the-art detectors by delving into the adversaries and demonstrate the need for
robust forgery detectors.
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Additionally, recent survey papers [81, 77, 51] in the domain present a comprehensive un-
derstanding on the state-of-the-art methods and comparative analysis.
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3 Background
3.1 CNNs for feature extraction
Facenet [67] provides a unique embedding space for facial recognition and clustering. This
deep convolutional neural network uses triplet loss for training where the objective is to not
only minimize the distance between the feature points of the same face in a euclidean space









i )− f(xni )||
2
2 + α]+ (1)
where a, p, and n are anchor, positive, and negative samples respectively. f(x) represents
the embedding vector of an image. α is defined as the margin between positive and negative
pairs. It is essentially a threshold that determines how distant positive pairs should be
relative to that of negative pairs. A secondary advantage of using triplet loss is that there
exists a large set data samples from all the possible combinations of anchors and positives
even if the dataset isn’t large enough. The embedding space of the Facenet architecture is
designed to be 128-dimensional.
XceptionNet (Fig. 2) [12] is a deep convolutional neural network that enhances feature
abstraction by using modified depthwise separable convolutions instead of traditional 2D
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Figure 2: XceptionNet as a feature extraction model, converting each video frame to a latent
vector embedding.
convolutions. As the architecture is a deep network, residual connections establish an identity
nexus for the gradients to be propagated in a better fashion without any depreciation. The
model produces a 2048-dimensional feature space for a 299 x 299 RGB image. On the
Imagenet [15] leaderboard, XceptionNet is shown to perform better in a classification setting
than traditional deep networks [70, 24, 73].
EfficientNet [76] is a neural architecture designed using neural architecture search (NAS).
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Figure 3: EfficientNet baseline archiecture [76].
NAS is a technique for automating the design process of a deep artificial neural network.
Traditionally, CNNs are designed in an austere fashion and scaled up to improve the per-
formance. The conventional method of scaling involves either the width or the depth of
the network. The authors present a compound model scaling technique against available re-
sources to improve the performance of a model. They perform a grid search of the available
scaling options to determine the scaling coefficients and test the performance of the model
layer-by-layer. Using this information, they scale the baseline network to the desired size
which is computationally viable as constrained.
However, to design an efficient model as a whole, the baseline architecture should be able
to extract adequate features from the image dynamics. This hypothesis drove the team to
rely on MnasNet [75] for the design of the baseline network. They scaled up the baseline to
obtain a family of models, named EfficientNets (variants ranging from B0 to B7). In com-
parison with the traditional classifiers [70, 24, 73, 12] on Imagenet [15], EfficientNets showed
outstanding performance with a reduction in parameter size and floating point operations.
Likewise, they also proved to be consistent in transfer learning applications.
Akash Chintha’s Masters Thesis Document 23
3.2 Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
Recurrent units from RNNs suffer from perpetuating short-term memory. If a set of features
are passed into recurrent units in multiple timesteps, RNNs fail in utilizing features from
earlier timesteps to later timesteps when making an informed decision pertaining to the task.
LSTMs were created as a solution to the short-term memory drawback. They are designed
with internal gates that regulate the flow of information between timesteps.
Figure 4: An LSTM unit (adapted from [26])
Akash Chintha’s Masters Thesis Document 24













ct = σ(ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ ćt)
ht = tanh(ct) ∗ ot
(2)
where i, f , and o indicate input, forget and output gates respectively. Additionally, c stands
for the cell state and h stands for the hidden state of an LSTM unit.
The core idea of a working LSTM is its cell state and the operations carried out by the
gates. In theory, the cell state is expected to carry relevant information down the temporal
sequence of the recurrent layer. During training, the gates act as tiny neural units that decide
which information is considered relevant. Information from the previous hidden state and
the current input is passed through the forget gate ft where the sigmoid activation decides
if the information needs to be memorized or ignored. At the input gate it, tanh activation
constrains the information between -1 and 1, thus regulating the network. This knowledge
is multiplied with the resultant forget state to ensure that only relevant information is
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propagated. Eventually, the output gate ot decides what the next hidden state ht should be.
The hidden state is responsible in carrying the information from the previous inputs of the
LSTM layer.
3.3 Optical Flow
Naively, optical flow is defined as the pattern of motion caused by moving objects in a video.
OpenCV [8] provides extracting two types of flow from a visual motion sequence, namely
sparse flow and dense flow. Sparse flow uses Lucas-Kanade [49] method and produces the
flow vectors of salient feature set of pixels in an image i.e., corners or geometric center of
objects whereas dense flow generates instance-level flow vectors of the entire frame regardless
of the object in focus. For dense flow, OpenCV computes the magnitude and direction of the
flow from a 2-D array of flow vectors. OpenCV’s dense flow uses Gunnar Farneback’s [19]
algorithm.
3.4 Edge Detection
Edge detection involves a variety of mathematical transformations on the image that aim to
extract the edges at the pixels across which there are discontinuities in the intensity. Sobel,
Prewitt, Laplacian, and Canny are some of the most common edge detection algorithms.
Sobel, Prewitt, and Laplacian edge detectors use simple two-dimensional filters that operate
on the image to produce an edge map whereas Canny edge detection is relatively complex
in functioning.
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Canny edge detector is also the most effective of the aforementioned algorithms. It follows
a series of operations on an image in order to produce an edge map. The first step of Canny
edge detection involves applying Gaussian filter on the image to attenuate the noise. Now,
the gradients (and their orientation) of the filtered image are computed using either of Sobel
or Prewitt edge detectors. To this intermediate map, non-maximum suppression is applied
so that remaining noisy pixels and thin broken edges are suppressed. This leaves out both
properly drawn edges and broken edges due to suppression applied in the previous step.
Hysteresis is a method of linking such broken edges that are meant to be connected. Using
appropriate thresholding, smaller edges can be ignored and perceptible ones are conjoined.
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4 Proposed Deepfake Detection Architecture
Although newer deepfake generative algorithms process multiple frames at a time and devise
a flow-based learning metric, the existence of temporal inconsistencies is plausible regardless
of any post-processing during their generation. To equip ourselves in detecting any forged
audio or video, we discuss the advantages of recurrent conformations over convolutional
feature extractors by presenting deep neural models in visual domain. Our architecture for
deepfake detection is inspired by the spatio-temporal processing used in prior works [22, 71].
We use a convolutional architecture to obtain a vector representation of a facial region of a
frame, fi. A sequence of such facial regions from frames, f1, f2, . . . , ff are passed into a bidi-
rectional LSTM module to learn a latent representation capable of discriminating between
facial manipulations and original faces. Additionally, we leverage the optical flow from the
video to endow the model with dense visual features and facilitate in robust discrimination
of deepfakes apart from the original videos.
4.1 Preprocessing
4.1.1 Face Extraction
The dlib [32] face detector determines the primary face over each frame in the video. Canon-
ical face images are generated by cropping to the dlib facial bounding box with a multiplier
three times the area of the extracted bounding box, resampling to 299 × 299 pixels, and
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normalized to zero mean and unit variance.
As dlib extracts faces individually for each frame, we observed that the subsequent face
images have subtle differences in the box coordinates. Similar to Faceswap-GAN [47], we
apply a linear smoothing filter over the box coordinates of consecutive frames to mitigate
the temporal inconsistency introduced in the extraction process.
4.1.2 Optical flow and Edges
We use OpenCV [8] to extract the dense optical flow from the consecutive frames in a video.
If there exist n frames in a video, we get n−1 flow maps. The dense optical flow is generated
using three layers of pyramids where each layer is half the size of the previous. The window
size for constructing the flow is set to 15 for three iterations. Then, the flow is represented
in RGB channels to signify the magnitude and direction of motion.
Figure 5: The EdgeFlow (EF) input shown on the right is generated using the test sample
on the left.
In addition to the flow map between kth and (k+ 1)th frames, we propose supplementing the
dense flow map with the edges produced in the kth frame. OpenCV’s canny edge detection is
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employed for this strategy. The OpenCV function for canny edge detection has a provision
for manual threshold apart from the image. The threshold is set to 100 below which all
edges detected are discarded. The canny edge function returns a grayscale image with
sparse features which is converted into an RGB image.
Eventually, an edgeflow map is devised by element-wise addition between the edge map and
the flow map; as depicted in Figure 5.
4.2 Architectures
4.2.1 CNN+Temporal Model
Canonical faces are encoded using the CNNs described in Section 3.1. We propose FacenetL-
STM, XcepTemporal, and EffTemporal; convolutional recurrent networks with multiple lev-
els of temporal feature abstraction. The spatial features from the CNN module are passed
into a first bidirectional-LSTM layer. The outputs of the first bidirectional-LSTM layer are
passed to a second bidirectional-LSTM layer to produce secondary feature abstraction. The
feature vector from the last LSTM unit of this second bidirectional layer is passed into a fully-
connected layer and finally to a classification layer. Dropout is added to the fully-connected
layer for regularization.
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Figure 6: The CNN+Temporal model. Faces are first extracted and normalized to a canonical
representation. These canonical images are passed into a convolutional recurrent model to
make a prediction. µ and σ2 represent the mean and variance of the distribution in a two-
dimensional space.
4.2.2 RGB+EF XcepTemporal Model
Although the CNN+Temporal model seemed to work well for within-dataset test samples, it
is still only an initial step towards building robust deepfake detectors. The CNN+Temporal
model is sensitive to visual constituents like lighting, blur, noise, and compression. This
makes the model vulnerable to manipulations by such adversarial elements.
We propose leveraging the dense motion facets of the video as it not only invigorates resilience
against adversarial attacks but also provides the recurrent layers with beyond-the-visual flow
attributes which could ultimately be used in making a better decision.
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Figure 7: The early fusion, mid-fusion, and late fusion (left to right) variants of XceptionNet
feature extractor of the RGB+EF XcepTemporal model.
As described in Section 4.1.2, we devise edge flow maps that can be used to enhance the
feature abstraction ability of the CNN feature extractor. We chose XceptionNet [12] as
the feature extractor in designing the RGB+EF variants of the model. The entry flow and
exit flow of XceptionNet described in Figure 7 are shown in blue and purple regions in
Figure 2 respectively. The plus (+) symbol indicates element-wise addition of features at
that particular layer.
4.2.3 Loss Functions
Faces from real videos are hypothesized to have their own embedding distribution, while
different types of generated fake videos can either be clustered together or in disparate
distributions. The main goal in our system is to discriminate the real video distribution
from that of the forged videos. To this end, we compare the use of two loss functions for
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learning the discrimination accurately: Cross-entropy and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
Cross-entropy loss is the conventional loss used in classification and is defined as







where yc is the ground truth logit value and (1 + nf ) represents one class for real videos
alongside nf deepfake classes.
KL divergence, also known as relative entropy, is a natural approach to measure the
differences amongst probability distributions. Inspired from the application of KL divergence
in variational autoencoders [34], the high-level idea is to disentangle different probability
distributions via parameter learning. We hypothesize that the probability distribution of
the real and ersatz material [5] when mapped into a two-dimensional space from the latent
feature representation generated after the primary fully-connected layer can be disentangled.
In this setting, mean (µ) and variance (σ) of the bivariate normal distribution N are esti-
mated to be computed from the latent feature vector. The loss function encourages the model
to distinguish one distribution from another. The bivariate KL divergence is represented as:





i − log(σi)− 1) (4)
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We use λ = (1/2).
Similar to the Fisher linear discriminant loss, the KL loss is equivalent to the sum of class-
wise KL divergences. Intuitively, the KL loss distributes all the learned samples of each class
in a densely packed normal distribution and clusters the samples from one class further away








The choice of using a two-dimensional space was determined empirically.
We also propose to use an ensemble of the learning procedures with a convex combination
of the cross-entropy and KL divergence losses. The ensemble loss function is defined as:
LEN = λ1 LKL + λ2 LCE (6)
where λ1 and λ2 are the weights allocated to respective loss metrics to provide a flexible over-
all loss function. We typically allocate a larger weight to KL divergence than cross-entropy
for deepfake detection, as KL divergence aids in driving the real and fake distributions further
apart.
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4.2.4 Variants
As we proposed to make use of two different loss metrics, they were made use in isolation
and also in combination to define the variants of our CNN+Temporal model. We then
choose the best performing loss metric across the variants of the CNN+Temporal network in
RGB+EF XcepTemporal model. Within the XceptionNet model architecture of RGB+EF
XcepTemporal model, we introduce various fusion techniques and comprehend which of them
performs the best during inference.
We propose four variants of the CNN+Temporal model:
1. CNN+Temporal (CE).
• CNN+Temporal with cross-entropy loss LCE.
• It follows the horizontal line path to the blue box labelled ”Class Layer” in Fig-
ure 6.
2. CNN+Temporal (KL).
• CNN+Temporal with KL divergence loss LKL.
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• It follows the dashed line path to the yellow box labelled ”KL-Divergence” in
Figure 6.
3. CNN+Temporal (EN).
• CNN+Temporal with ensemble loss LEN .
• This variant has two classes in the classification layer of the model (real and fake).
• It has a Y-shaped final layer where the outputs are a two-class classification layer
and a sample in two-dimensional space.
4. CNN+Temporal (EN1+n).
• CNN+Temporal with ensemble loss LEN .
• This variant has 1 + nf classes in the classification layer of the model (one real
and nf fakes).
• It has a Y-shaped ultimate layer where the outputs are a (1 + nf ) - class classifi-
cation layer and a sample in two-dimensional space.
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• This variant not only distinguishes the distribution of fakes from original faces
but also determines the type of fake.
We propose three variants of the RGB+EF XcepTemporal model:
1. RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Early Fusion).
• RGB+EF XcepTemporal with KL divergence loss LKL.
• The CNN feature extraction is depicted on the left in Figure 7.
• Both the inputs i.e., the face and its edge flow are fused early to produce a 6-
channel input for the XceptionNet model
2. RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Mid-Fusion).
• RGB+EF XcepTemporal with KL divergence loss LKL.
• The CNN feature extraction is depicted in the centre of Figure 7.
• Both the inputs have separate streams of entry flow and are element-wise added
to have a single exit flow.
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3. RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Late Fusion).
• RGB+EF XcepTemporal with KL divergence loss LKL.
• The CNN feature extraction is depicted on the right in Figure 7.
• Both the inputs have separate streams of entry and exit flows and their feature
vectors are element-wise added to produce a single feature vector.
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5 Results
5.1 Datasets
UADFV [86] uses traditional vision approaches to generate manipulated videos. The gen-
eration process maps the facial landmark points of the source to that of the target. This
dataset consists of 49 real and 49 fake videos.
DeepfakeTIMIT [36] was built from the VidTIMIT [66] dataset using a GAN-based face
swap [47] over dataset subjects. This dataset uses 32 subjects, each with 10 face swap videos
of both low and high quality for a total of 620 fake videos.
FaceForensics++ [62] contains four different types of deepfakes, namely Face2Face [79],
FaceSwap [47], Deepfakes, and NeuralTextures [78], alongside corresponding real videos. The
dataset contains 1000 real source videos and 1000 of each of the four deepfake generation
methods. Since the traditional vision and face swap methods used to create the UADFV
and DeepfakeTIMIT datasets, respectively, are also in FaceForensics++, most works do not
report on UADFV or DeepfakeTIMIT.
The FaceForensics++ dataset was updated on 23rd August 2019 to host the Deep Fake
Detection (DFD) dataset from Google and JigSaw [62], which consists of 360 original
source videos and 3000 manipulated videos.
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Celeb-DF [44] was built from 400 original YouTube videos and 800 synthesized videos.
Unlike the aforementioned datasets, these fakes are refined to address issues with color
inconsistency, low-frequency smoothing, and temporal flickering. Additional refinements
include synthesis of higher-resolution fakes (256 × 256), whereas the algorithms used in
previous works synthesized low-resolution (64× 64) fakes.
Deepfake Detection Challenge (DFDC) [17] by Facebook consists of 19k real videos
and 95k deepfakes generated using the real videos. The manipulated set of the challenge
consists of face replacements and video tampering. As our work doesn’t focus on detecting
visual tampering, a partial dataset, referred to as DFDC-mini in the later sections, was
isolated with 872 real videos and their corresponding 1241 face replacement videos.
YouTube (YT) consists of 20 real and 20 fake videos that we collected from YouTube.com
as a way to test accuracy on unseen samples. The 20 real videos all feature a single camera-
facing subject, while the 20 fake videos are from the Ctrl Shift Face YouTube channel.3 We
do not know which deepfake technique the creator of this channel uses, however we do know
that he uses face-swapping as opposed to facial re-enactment methods.
The datasets UADFV and DeepfakeTIMIT are not used in this research as the quality of
the fakes in these video datasets are visibly distinguishable and prior works already proved
3https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKpH0CKltc73e4wh0_pgL3g/
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to detect these fakes quite easily. We also chose not to utilize DFD dataset in our work
because the samples resemble FaceSwaps from FaceForensics++. We decide to concentrate
on FaceForensics++, Celeb-DF, and the more difficult DFDC-mini dataset for evaluating all
of our models. To test on the real-world deepfakes, we use DFDC-preview and YT datasets
to assess the efficiency of our models.
5.2 CNN+Temporal Model
5.2.1 Baselines
We compare our work with six high-performing deepfake detection models proposed in prior
work: CapsuleForensics [55], ClassNSeg [54], ConvLSTM [22], FaceNetLSTM [71], DenseNe-
tAligned [64], and XceptionNet [12]. We use code provided by the authors for this pur-
pose. The performance of most of these models have been previously reported on the same
datasets [62, 44]. For a fair comparison, however, we tested them along with our variants of
XcepTemporal on identical train and test splits.
Prior work did not describe how to address making a detection decision on an entire video
instead of a single frame. As we are interested in results on the entire video and to provide a
fair set of baselines for comparison, we propose a simple mechanism for converting a frame-
level model into a video-level model. We first pass the frame-level results, which produce a
higher value for frames that more likely to be fake, through a median filter with a window
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size of five, which helps to reduce false positives by smoothing out the resulting output. We
then take the maximum output from these windows as the overall result for the video. While
this can result in some false positives, it is important to detect a video as fake when even
just a short portion of the video is fake.
We applied this procedure to all of the baseline frame-level models to produce video-level
models, and we report the results for both frame-level and video-level models for multiple
methods of comparison.
5.2.2 Training
Split Train Validation Test
Videos 4520 904 819
Facial frames 1,437,681 281,462 248,623
Table 1: Data splits for our combined dataset, which is composed of the FaceForensics++
and Celeb-DF datasets.
We trained our CNN+Temporal model and the baseline models on the combination of the
full FaceForensics++ [62] and Celeb-DF [44] datasets. For the training, validation, and test
splits, we used the instructions provided along with the datasets. As Celeb-DF does not
offer any validation split, we randomly chose 50 real and 134 fake videos from the training
data to create a validation split. The test sets for both datasets was left unaltered. The
splits used are shown in Table 1.
We set the learning rate to 1e-4 with a decay factor of 1e-5. The optimizer is Adam, with β1
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Model
Dataset FaceForensics++ [62] Celeb-DF [44]
Real F2F NT DF FS Overall Real Fake Overall
ClassNSeg [54] 40.52 76.37 74.78 93.78 69.14 79.76 42.62 49.17 46.31
ConvLSTM [22] 83.13 88.72 85.71 92.91 90.61 87.84 74.76 80.22 78.17
DenseNetAligned [64] 90.68 89.32 87.30 94.05 91.32 90.53 71.66 87.90 81.39
CapsuleForensics [55] 90.20 96.88 97.40 96.00 97.22 95.54 - - -
XceptionNet [12] 91.82 96.13 98.14 99.21 99.89 97.03 79.62 95.12 89.55
Our Models
FaceNetLSTM [71] 94.01 87.20 86.89 89.16 90.60 89.57 72.95 84.11 79.83
XceptionNet (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 93.72 98.25 96.89
XcepTemporal (CE) 100 98.57 100 100 100 99.71 94.66 98.81 97.01
XcepTemporal (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 94.04 99.72 97.73
EffTemporal-B4 (CE) 100 100 100 100 100 100 95.13 98.64 97.21
EffTemporal-B4 (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 95.40 99.36 98.03
XcepTemporal (EN) 87.92 98.22 98.76 100 100 96.98 92.91 100 97.34
XcepTemporal (EN1+n) 93.10 96.61 95.02 99.93 99.82 96.89 95.01 99.22 97.83
Table 2: Within-Domain Accuracy: Frame-level accuracy on the FaceForensics++ [62]
and Celeb-DF [44] official test sets. Abbreviations: Face2Face (F2F), FaceSwap (FS), Deep-
fake (DF), and NeuralTextures (NT).
set to 0.9 and β2 set to 0.999, these being the default values suggested by Kingma and Ba’s
original paper on Adam [33]. A dropout of 0.5 is added to the first fully-connected layer.
Based upon hyperparameter tuning results, we set the sequence length to eight frames with
a stride of eight. All the variants of the model were trained end-to-end.
5.2.3 Within-Domain Results
The most basic test for deepfake detection is to train and test on the same datasets. We
show accuracy based on evaluating one frame at a time in Table 2, and show accuracy across
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the entire video in Table 3. We find that XceptionNet and EfficientNet based models are
very effective almost uniformly across all samples. In particular, the XceptionNet (KL) and
XcepTemporal (KL), EffTemporal (CE), and EffTemporal (KL) models achieve 100% accu-
racy for the entire FaceForensics++ dataset for both frame-level and video-level detection,
while XcepTemporal (CE) is close behind at 99.71% for frame-level detection and 100% for
video-level detection.
Among prior works, only XceptionNet [12] and CapsuleForensics [55] could achieve 97%
or above, where XceptionNet particularly suffers from false positives at over 8% FPR in
frame-level detection and over 11% FPR in video-level detection.
The two ensemble methods do not fare as well in FaceForensics++ at about 97% accuracy
on frames and 99% accuracy on full videos, but they reach new standards for accuracy on
the Celeb-DF dataset. EffTemporal (KL) has the overall best accuracy on frames at 98.03%
and 99.53% on full videos.
In our experience with training the models, using the 1.4M facial frames in the training set
(see Table 1), the CNN+Temporal (CE) takes four epochs to converge on the training data,
whereas the KL variant takes only two to three epochs to converge. The models with LKL
loss tend to converge faster than the cross-entropy loss LCE because the latent distribution
generated by the model is distinct between the original and the forged faces. By contrast,
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Model
Dataset FaceForensics++ [62] Celeb-DF [44]
Real F2F NT DF FS Overall Real Fake Overall
ClassNSeg [54] 47.14 65.71 60.00 64.29 48.57 57.14 - - -
ConvLSTM [22] 90.71 93.57 91.43 94.29 93.57 92.71 71.05 83.95 79.83
DenseNetAligned [64] 89.28 95.00 93.57 96.43 95.71 94.00 73.68 88.88 84.03
XceptionNet [12] 88.57 96.43 98.57 100 100 96.71 68.42 100 89.91
Our Models
FaceNetLSTM [71] 94.28 92.14 90.71 95.71 95.71 93.71 77.77 86.41 84.03
XceptionNet (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 89.48 93.83 92.44
XcepTemporal (CE) 100 100 100 100 100 100 97.37 100 99.16
XcepTemporal (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 97.37 100 99.16
EffTemporal-B4 (CE) 100 100 100 100 100 100 97.64 100 99.24
EffTemporal-B4 (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 98.12 100 99.53
XcepTemporal (EN) 94.29 100 100 100 100 99.14 94.74 100 98.32
XcepTemporal (EN1+n) 97.86 99.29 97.86 100 100 99.00 97.37 100 99.16
Table 3: Within-Domain Results: Video-level accuracy on FaceForensics++ [62] and
Celeb-DF [44] official test sets.
Abbreviations: Face2Face (F2F), FaceSwap (FS), Deepfake (DF), and NeuralTextures (NT).
EN variants of the model take the longest to train (ten epochs) because the gradients from
both the losses compete with each other. The convergence is slower in the early stages of the
training, but once both the channels start learning, the rate of convergence nearly doubles.
The next sections will explore these models further to help understand how the architectural
variations affect performance.
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5.2.4 Cross-Domain Results
A critical property of deepfake detection models for real-world use is good inference per-
formance on deepfake types not included in the training dataset. One way to measure this
performance is to train on publicly available deepfake datasets from Table 1, and test on the
unforeseen cross-domain samples in the Deepfake Detection Challenge preview dataset [17].
As shown in Table 4, we use binary class models, such that we expect the unforeseen fakes,
M-A and M-B to be both classified as fakes. Table 4 shows that the KL variant of our
XcepTemporal model performs significantly better than the CE variant. We believe this
is because the KL loss naturally encourages larger margins between the two different dis-
tributions. By encouraging existing classes (real vs. forgery) to be far apart, unforeseen
cross-domain variations are more likely to fall on the correct side of the boundary.
5.2.5 Compression
A simple but effective way to bypass deepfake detection is to apply compression to the
deepfake video. This section examines the performance of our models on two different types
of compression techniques (JPEG and MPEG).
JPEG Compression. OpenCV [8] provides an option to compress individual frames with
a reduction in quality as shown in Fig. 8. The quality factor is a measure of the compression
rate of JPEG images, ranging between 0 and 100. High numbers between 90-100 represent
3https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKpH0CKltc73e4wh0_pgL3g/
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Model
Dataset DFDC [17] YT
Real M-A M-B Real Fake
ClassNSeg [54] 25.02 76.21 71.07 49.00 54.62
ConvLSTM [22] 59.41 20.68 51.39 77.90 92.45
FacenetLSTM [71] 58.32 13.68 69.02 81.38 90.36
DenseNetAligned [64] 69.12 35.17 52.31 75.25 92.30
XceptionNet [12] 54.67 28.63 74.55 93.82 95.25
Our Models
Xception (KL) 67.18 55.91 76.11 98.35 100
XcepTemporal (CE) 87.34 65.99 85.03 100 100
XcepTemporal (KL) 92.19 73.21 88.34 100 100
XcepTemporal (EN) 93.26 76.08 90.10 100 100
Table 4: Cross-Domain Results: Models trained on FaceForensics++ [62] and Celeb-
DF [44] and then tested on out-of-sample DFDC-preview [17] and YT datasets. Method-A
(M-A) and Method-B (M-B) are two types of manipulated videos released in the DFDC-
preview dataset.
minimal visual quality loss, while numbers less than 60 represent visually significant quality
loss. Lower quality factor images take up less disk space. Table 5 shows the test accuracies
for our models as well as for the DenseNetAligned and XceptionNet models, two of the best
models in our results for uncompressed video. Our models perform the best on most settings
in the Face2Face, Deepfakes, FaceSwap, and Celeb-DF datasets, while XceptionNet performs
the best for JPEG compression on NeuralTextures fakes. We note a severe degradation in
deepfake detection performance across all the models for highly compressed faces. The accu-
racies are significantly more affected by compression on re-enactment-type fakes (Face2Face
and NeuralTextures) than the replacement-type (Deepfakes and FaceSwap).
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Model F2F NT DF FS Celeb-DF
DenseNetAligned [64]
JPEG Quality = 75 64.69 70.10 76.49 70.33 48.67
JPEG Quality = 50 29.17 25.34 56.60 50.44 13.16
JPEG Quality = 25 0.32 0.26 12.90 18.31 4.03
MPEG Quant. = 20 73.68 62.44 79.51 77.63 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 18.17 20.31 52.11 45.67 -
XceptionNet [12]
JPEG Quality = 75 75.60 70.17 89.32 91.59 63.02
JPEG Quality = 50 50.62 45.48 73.38 72.73 30.78
JPEG Quality = 25 0.81 0.53 20.17 16.84 7.29
MPEG Quant. = 20 80.12 75.24 84.25 82.38 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 27.16 25.41 60.05 56.59 -
Our Models
XcepTemporal (CE)
JPEG Quality = 75 80.62 69.54 99.40 95.63 82.65
JPEG Quality = 50 42.31 37.06 89.23 80.86 52.31
JPEG Quality = 25 0.07 0.03 37.28 46.04 1.32
MPEG Quant. = 20 98.66 86.16 90.13 88.62 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 48.75 16.96 78.95 64.64 -
XcepTemporal (KL)
JPEG Quality = 75 84.33 61.07 99.82 97.81 84.19
JPEG Quality = 50 53.05 18.44 97.95 94.45 48.68
JPEG Quality = 25 0.02 0.01 18.97 46.67 0.81
MPEG Quant. = 20 93.86 88.81 95.02 91.17 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 0.07 46.04 37.28 0.03 -
Table 5: Compression: Results for different rates of compression. Results in bold indicate
the best results across the four tested models for the given setting. Note that high JPEG
quality means less compression, while high MPEG quantization means more compression.
MPEG Compression. The models were additionally tested on the effects of video com-
pression using videos saved at two different H.264 quantization factor levels, as previously
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Figure 8: Visualization of image compression on a test sample. The original frame is shown
in the top-left corner. Compression using JPEG Quality 75, 50, and 25 are displayed in the
top-right, lower-left, and lower-right corners, respectively.
explored by Agarwal et al. [4]. The quantization factor reflects the MPEG compression rate
of the videos. The higher the quantization factor, the lower the quality and greater the
compression. We selected a quantization value of 20 to represent high-quality MPEG videos
and 40 to represent low quality MPEG videos. Table 5 shows a drastic drop in accuracy at
the quantization factor of 40.
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Model F2F NT DF FS Celeb-DF
DenseNetAligned [64]
Original 86.16 84.61 87.16 83.01 81.62
JPEG Quality = 75 85.16 82.06 87.81 85.02 82.57
JPEG Quality = 50 83.81 80.04 75.28 78.93 81.36
JPEG Quality = 25 71.68 68.12 66.52 69.30 72.61
MPEG Quant. = 20 83.18 82.90 86.47 85.12 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 68.23 63.02 59.31 58.80 -
XceptionNet [12]
Original 91.57 93.72 90.68 94.33 92.03
JPEG Quality = 75 90.42 89.56 88.30 89.16 90.91
JPEG Quality = 50 86.88 85.72 82.75 86.31 88.42
JPEG Quality = 25 80.43 79.64 80.11 72.63 85.80
MPEG Quant. = 20 89.14 90.61 90.12 92.67 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 88.00 84.56 81.40 82.52 -
Our Models
XcepTemporal (CE)
Original 98.55 93.17 97.84 99.44 99.8
JPEG Quality = 75 97.9 93.32 98.44 99.18 99.95
JPEG Quality = 50 97.5 93.04 99.78 99.2 100
JPEG Quality = 25 94.11 81.52 96.47 98.1 98.35
MPEG Quant. = 20 97.54 96.78 92.05 85.31 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 87.81 89.84 83.42 68.91 -
XcepTemporal (KL)
Original 94.26 84.8 97.73 98.68 99.99
JPEG Quality = 75 98.62 92.66 98.11 99.8 100
JPEG Quality = 50 98.01 92.09 99.15 99.71 100
JPEG Quality = 25 94.26 84.8 97.72 98.68 100
MPEG Quant. = 20 97.22 95.03 94.67 89.79 -
MPEG Quant. = 40 90.62 86.32 78.3 70.01 -
Table 6: Compression: Models trained on augmented training data consisting of the orig-
inal and JPEG compressed (Quality-50) versions of all the training faces.
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Data Augmentation. As the compression artifacts divulge an area of weakness for all
methods, we considered retraining models with data augmentation. The models from Ta-
ble 5 are retrained using both the original training data as well as with their corresponding
JPEG compressed faces with a quality factor of 50. The test results are presented in Table 6.
With a minimal loss in accuracy on the original test sets, all the models gained robustness
in detecting forged faces which are compressed at various compression levels. In this setting,
our models become the top performers in all but three of the 28 configurations tested. Im-
pressively, the XcepTemporal (KL) model attains 84.8-100% accuracy for JPEG Quality of
25, which has a substantial reduction in visual quality, as shown in Figure 8. In contrast,
neither DenseNetAligned nor XceptionNet got above 81% in any of the tests with this low
quality. On MPEG compression, our models also perform best in the Face2Face, NeuralTex-
tures, and Deepfakes, with XcepTemporal (CE) getting above 83% on these datasets. On
the FaceSwap dataset, however, XceptionNet was significantly better – this marks the main
exception to our overall findings that showed our models to be superior.
An interesting observation is that the test accuracies for the MPEG compression rise after
retraining on datasets augmented just with the JPEG compression samples and not with the
MPEG samples.
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5.2.6 Transfer learning / Domain Adaptation.
As new deepfake generation algorithms are released, companion deepfake detection algo-
rithms follow. In a phenomenon referred to as catastrophic forgetting, when new data sam-
ples are introduced into a training regiment, the performance on original samples suffers.
Model
Dataset FaceForensics++ [62] Celeb-DF [44]
Real F2F NT DF FS Overall Real Fake Overall
XceptionNet [12] 89.90 94.26 98.77 99.56 99.13 96.32 70.88 95.31 86.17
XceptionNet (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 93.21 98.25 96.89
XcepTemporal (CE) 98.95 98.57 100 100 100 99.83 92.77 99.81 96.78
XcepTemporal (KL) 100 100 100 100 100 100 93.82 99.02 97.18
XcepTemporal (EN) 83.22 97.75 95.31 100 100 95.25 93.12 100 97.51
XcepTemporal (EN1+n) 89.67 96.08 94.53 99.90 99.61 95.95 93.19 100 98.01
Table 7: Transfer learning/Domain Adaptation: Models are initialized on FaceForen-
sics++ [62] and trained on Celeb-DF [44] along with 50 out of 720 Faceforensics++ videos
of each class to prevent forgetting.
We train our model on FaceForensics++ and transfer learn to Celeb-DF. During transfer
learning, all the layers but the classification layer (for CE variant) are frozen. After conver-
gence, we lower the learning rate and fine-tune all layers. To prevent catastrophic forgetting,
we include 50 (out of 720) randomly chosen samples from each FaceForensics++ deepfake
type along with the Celeb-DF training data. The results are shown in Table 7. We note
that after the final stage of training, our models perform well on all datasets, showing their
ability to learn new types of fakes without forgetting how to classify original fakes.
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5.2.7 Ablation Study
To help understand our model further, we explore several aspects and elucidate on the
decisions involved in defining the model.
Recurrent layers. To understand the importance of recurrent layers in the XcepTemporal
model, Table 8 shows the combinations between uni/bidirectional and single/double LSTM
layers. The results in Table 8 suggest that the backward pass within a recurrent layer
extracts meaningful temporal information. In addition, the added parameters from the
secondary layer help improve results.
Recurrent Layers FF++ Celeb-DF
Uni + Single 92.37 84.48
Uni + Double 92.9 86.02
Bi + Single 96.99 93.21
Bi + Double 99.71 97.01
Table 8: Ablation: Accuracy of XcepTemporal (CE) with different recurrent structures.
Length and Stride. We now examine the variation in performance for different lengths
of the input sequence and different lengths of strides between two consecutive input se-
quences. Longer sequence lengths enable temporal features of longer duration but require
more compute resources.
The combined accuracy on both the test sets shown in Table 1 for different lengths and









Table 9: Ablation: Accuracy of XcepTemporal (CE) on the combined test sets for various
length and stride combinations.
strides is shown in Table 9. While the overall accuracy does not change much, we chose a
length and stride of eight because
1) shorter sample lengths translate into more training samples
2) shorter sample lengths are more capable at detecting short sequences of manipulated
frames embedded between real frames.
5.3 RGB+EF XcepTemporal Model
5.3.1 Within-Domain Results
Unlike the CNN+Temporal model, RGB+EF XcepTemporal model requires preprocessed
edge flow maps from the whole dataset for training and evaluation. To validate the perfor-
mance of the model, DFDC-mini dataset was chosen from which the edge flow maps were
extracted prior to training. As the isolated dataset contains only a couple of thousands of
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videos, a random 60-40 split for training and testing was carried out, while maintaining the
ratio between the number of real and fake videos on both the sets. The variants of the model
are trained alongside the best performing CNN+Temporal models and evaluated on the held
out test set.
Model Real Fake Overall
XcepTemporal (CE) 90.45 96.64 94.25
XcepTemporal (KL) 90.36 97.13 94.67
EffTemporal-B4 (CE) 90.23 97.57 94.65
EffTemporal-B4 (KL) 90.51 98.10 95.15
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Early Fusion) 92.68 99.32 96.76
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Mid-Fusion) 95.37 99.53 97.94
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Late Fusion) 91.33 99.45 96.38
Table 10: Within-Domain Results: Our models, CNN+Temporal and RGB+EF
XcepTemporal, and their variants are trained on the train set and evaluated on the test
set of DFDC-mini dataset.
From Table 10, it can be observed that leveraging the edge and flow information from the
video facilitates in better discrimination between the real and forged videos. Compared
to FaceForensics++ [62] and Celeb-DF [44], DFDC [17] has a diversified range of videos
where the subjects were exposed from low lighting to outdoor conditions, rapid camera
movements and an exhaustive list of such factors. These aspects explain the relative drop
in test accuracies across datasets.
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5.3.2 Cross-Domain Results
A basic requirement in building a deepfake detector that can be employed in real-world ap-
plication is to test its performance on unforeseen forgery. Although the RGB+EF XcepTem-
poral model accurately detects forged videos from the test set of the DFDC-mini dataset, we
next test the trustworthiness of the model by testing on datasets not seen during training.
Model Real Fake Overall
XcepTemporal (CE) 64.10 77.59 72.46
XcepTemporal (KL) 63.68 78.41 72.74
EffTemporal-B4 (CE) 67.64 78.89 74.38
EffTemporal-B4 (KL) 67.20 80.15 75.01
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Early Fusion) 71.92 84.31 79.46
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Mid-Fusion) 73.33 86.81 81.29
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Late Fusion) 72.44 86.68 80.56
Table 11: Cross-Domain Results: Our models, CNN+Temporal and RGB+EF XcepTem-
poral, and their variants are trained on the FaceForensics++ [62] train set and evaluated on
the DFDC-mini dataset.
We trained the model on FaceForensics++ dataset and tested it on the whole DFDC-mini
dataset. From the results in Table 11, it is evident that incorporating the edgeflow input into
the model significantly improves the forgery detection accuracy across domains. Although
the deepfake generation process was different across the datasets, these edgeflow maps pro-
vide the model with rich beyond-the-visual instance-level flow attributes between successive
frames that conceivably came into effect during the training. It can also be learned that
the mid-fusion variant of the RGB+EF XcepTemporal model performed marginally better
Akash Chintha’s Masters Thesis Document 56
than its counterparts because its design provided the model with more favorable dynamics
for semantic feature abstraction.
5.3.3 Immunizability on Adversarial Attacks
Our models use first-order visual features as inputs. To make our models resilient against any
first-order attacks, the models must be aware of them in the first place. Some of the known
perturbations to the images are blurring, compressing, cropping, luminating/darkening, and
additive noise; or a random combination of them. As our models are trained on the Dlib [32]
extracted and extended faces irrespective of the location of the face in the video, cropping
doesn’t significantly impact the performance of both of our models. Prior work has shown
that manipulating the lighting in the video doesn’t affect deepfake detectors in general
because the datasets are diverse in the lighting spectrum. So, we choose to experiment with
blur, compression, and noise on our models. For analysis purpose, we choose Gaussian noise
and Gaussian blur out of numerous types that can be applied on the images.
For all the experiments, we arbitrarily administer one of the following options on each sample
(as shown in Figure 9):
• Additive Gaussian Noise (random normal distribution) - µ = 0 and σ ε [1, 5].
• Gaussian Blur with one of the kernel sizes - 3, 5, 7, or 9.
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• JPEG Image Compression with a quality factor chosen from a range of 25 to 75.
Figure 9: Visualization of the attacks on a test sample. The sample is administered with
the least and most perturbations of the corresponding attacks exercised in the experiments.
For the combined column in Tables 12 and 13, we apply all the three attacks on all the
samples during testing.
Before immunizing both our models against such attacks, they were tested on individual
and combined attacks as shown in Table 12. The RGB+EF XcepTemporal variants show
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Model Blur Compression Noise Combined
XcepTemporal (CE) 47.22 35.81 19.48 12.24
XcepTemporal (KL) 43.78 38.16 15.57 11.96
EffTemporal-B4 (CE) 48.12 53.68 18.21 10.54
EffTemporal-B4 (KL) 40.03 51.24 17.40 12.89
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Early Fusion) 63.44 64.83 56.42 37.58
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Mid-Fusion) 67.18 68.39 70.30 45.75
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Late Fusion) 60.11 69.10 63.61 41.40
Table 12: Pre-Immunization Results: Our models, CNN+Temporal and RGB+EF
XcepTemporal, and their variants are evaluated on the adversarial attacks administered
on the whole DFDC-mini dataset. The accuracies reported are overall accuracy across the
test set of the dataset.
Model Blur Compression Noise Combined
XcepTemporal (CE) 78.54 79.89 75.26 70.44
XcepTemporal (KL) 80.27 79.43 77.61 70.63
EffTemporal-B4 (CE) 82.16 81.74 78.04 73.73
EffTemporal-B4 (KL) 84.31 82.10 79.06 73.91
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Early Fusion) 87.16 88.18 85.08 77.34
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Mid-Fusion) 88.32 91.69 89.31 78.15
RGB+EF XcepTemporal (Late Fusion) 87.49 86.62 87.00 78.41
Table 13: Post-Immunization Results: Our models, CNN+Temporal and RGB+EF
XcepTemporal, and their variants are evaluated on the adversarial attacks administered on
the whole DFDC-mini dataset. The accuracies reported are overall accuracy across the test
set of the dataset.
significant improvement in detection over the CNN+Temporal variants, specifically when
the attacks are combined during inference.
The models are retrained on the augmented train set and evaluated on the test set of the
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DFDC-mini dataset. The results are shown in Table 13. When immunized to the adversarial
attacks, all of our models seemed to acclimatize comfortably. This experiment demonstrates
the adaptability of our models to known attacks and that these models can be attuned to
any future attacks when their mode of fabrication is ascertained.
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6 Conclusion
Inspired by recent progress in digital forgery, we introduce two models, CNN+Temporal,
a convolutional recurrent neural network framework for deepfake detection and RGB+EF
XcepTemporal, an improvement over the XcepTemporal model where semantically rich fea-
tures from the frame’s edge and denseflow information are exploited in addition to the
frames themselves. We use ImageNet [15] pretrained XceptionNet and EfficientNet features
as salient and efficient facial feature representations. These representations are passed into
bidirectional recurrent layers to aid in detecting temporal inconsistencies across the frames.
Our model is trained both with traditional cross entropy and KL divergence loss functions.
We demonstrate the robustness of our methods on the popular FaceForensics++ and Celeb-
DF datasets, as well as the custom-created DFDC-mini dataset. Our methods obtain new
benchmark standards and are shown to generalize well to unforeseen attacks. We reckon
our work will be used as a baseline network in building more resilient models for detecting
deepfakes and other analogous applications.
6.1 Future Work
This work presents a convolutional recurrent network to identify forged videos apart from
unaltered videos. Taking this network as baseline, we employ the dense flow maps along with
edge maps as additional input channels to provide the recurrent network with semantically
richer features. However, as described in earlier sections, the model is sensitive to the visual
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aspects like blur and compression. As the proposed models only utilize visual input and its
flow, there is plenty of room for improving on it. Some of the possible extensions to our
proposed work are:
• Experimenting with mid-fusion at other stages of the XceptionNet architecture; fusing
after all the eight separable convolutional blocks, for instance.
• Replacing XceptionNet with EfficientNet-B4 and defining multiple variants in the
RGB+EF XcepTemporal model.
• Using the EdgeFlow (EF) as a segregated three-channel input (first map consists of
edges, second map with the ∆x of the dense optical flow, and the third map with the
∆y of the dense flow) instead of a unified three-channel input.
• Syncing between the audio and the visuals because the audio in a forged video might
not be consistent with the visuals.
• Using action units derived from the facial landmark movement between the frames to
distinguish natural facial motion with that of computer generated.
• Behavior analysis using dense visual input and/or sparse facial landmarks.
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• Manually extracting multiple degrees of motion and analyzing its potential as a feature
set.
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